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INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice Warren Burger and two other federal judges initiated disbarment
proceedings against me in 1966.1 The charge was that, in a lecture to a group of
*

Professor of Law, Hofstra University; author, MONROE H.

FREEDMAN

&

ABBE SMrH, UNDERSTANDING

LAWYERS' ETmcs (3d ed., 2004). I am grateful to I. Bennett Capers, Sarah Izquierdo, Jeffrey A. Meyer, Abbe

Smith, and Ralph Temple for valuable contributions.
1. The letter from the grievance committee initiating the proceedings referred to communications to the
committee from "[sleveral judges." Letter from Ralph A. Curtin, Secretary to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia Committee on Admissions and Grievance, to author (Jan. 12, 1966) (on file with author).
The judges proved to be Warren Burger, who, at the time, was ajudge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
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lawyers, I had expressed opinions that "appear to be in conflict with the Canons
of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association." 2 The offensive opinions
related to the criminal defense lawyer's conflicting ethical obligations in dealing
with client perjury, based on requirements in the Canons of Professional Ethics.3
While the disbarment proceedings were pending, the lecture became an article:
The Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
HardestQuestions.4 After four months of hearings and deliberations, the charges
were dismissed. As shown below, however, the controversy continues four
decades later, principally because of serious misunderstandings about of the
constitutional and policy issues involved.5
Part I of this article relates the beginning of the controversy over client perjury
in 1966. The discussion sets out the trilemma created by three ethical obligations
that are imposed upon the criminal defense lawyer. The first ethical obligation is
that the lawyer learn everything possible about a client's case. The second
obligation is that the lawyer keep knowledge about the client's case confidential
except to advance the client's interests. The third obligation is that the lawyer
reveal the client's confidential information to the court if doing so should become
necessary to expose what the lawyer knows to be perjurious testimony by the
client.
In a lecture to a group of lawyers in a Criminal Trial Institute, and in a
subsequent article, 6 I favored the view that the lawyer who knows that the client
intends to lie on the witness stand should make good faith efforts to dissuade the
client from committing the perjury, but, if unsuccessful in those efforts, the
lawyer should maintain confidentiality and should present the client's testimony

Circuit, and U.S. District Judges Alexander Holtzoff and George Hart. See, e.g., Court Clears Attorney in
Client-Lie Furor,THE SUNDAY STAR, May 15, 1966, at A14.
2. Letter from Ralph A. Curtin, Secretary to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Committee
on Admissions and Grievance, to author, (January 12, 1966) (on file with author).
3. See CANONS OF PROF'L ETMCS CANON 6 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS]; 1908 CANONS 8; 1908 CANONS
22; 1908 CANONS 37.
4. Monroe Freedman, The ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MiCH.L. REV. 1469 (1966). The article has been expanded and updated in FREEDMAN & SMITH
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics (3d ed., 2004) ("The Perjury Trilemma"). Yale Kamisar, then the junior
author of HALL & KAMISAR, MODERN CRMAL PRocEDuRE (1966), included the article in the book. This was
the first time that ethics materials were incorporated into another course, in what has come to be called the
"pervasive method" of teaching lawyers' ethics.
5. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman's Solution to the Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma Is
Wrong as a Matter of Policy and ConstitutionalLaw, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 821 (2006). Gillers' original title,
announced at a Hofstra Law School conference on lawyers' ethics, was The PerjuriousCriminalDefendant: A
Critiqueof Freedman'sCritique and All OtherSolutions (or Why Do We Keep Talking About This?). The answer
to Gillers' parenthetic question in his original title is this: We keep talking about the issue of the perjurious client
because commenters like Gillers persist in getting it wrong, by not recognizing how Model Rule 3.3 works in
practice, by ignoring the most important policy issue under that rule, and by misreading the relevant

constitutional cases.
6. See Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, supra note 4.
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at trial in the ordinary way.
Part IHof this article explains that the view that I expressed in the lecture and in
the article reflected the traditional resolution of the perjury trilemma by the
American bar. Part 11(A) notes that the ABA Canonsof ProfessionalEthics (1908)
imposed conflicting obligations of client confidentiality and of candor to the
court. 7 Resolving the conflict in formal opinions, the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility affirmed that a
lawyer's duty to preserve a client's confidences takes precedence over candor to
the court. 8
Part 1I(B) then discusses the ABA Model Code of Professional Rksponsibility
(1969), which appeared to reverse the bar's traditional position by requiring a
lawyer to reveal client fraud to the court. 9 However, the ABA House of Delegates
promptly approved the explanation that the obligation to reveal client perjury did
not relate to defense counsel in criminal cases.1 ° Shortly thereafter, the Model
Code was amended and interpreted in such a way as to maintain the traditional
resolution of the conflicting obligations." Indeed, the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics declared that to require a lawyer to reveal client confidences
to a court, even to rectify client perjury, would be "unthinkable."1 "
Part 1(C) then shows how a similar pattern has been followed under the ABA
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct (1983). Again, the rules appear to reject the
traditional view by expressly requiring the lawyer to reveal client perjury to the
court.13 However, the apparent rejection of the traditional view in Model Rule 3.3
has been rendered virtually meaningless because the disclosure obligation applies
only if the lawyer "knows" that the client's testimony is perjurious. 14 By giving
the "knowing" requirement a highly restrictive meaning, the ABA and the courts
have permitted lawyers to avoid concluding that a client is lying, despite the fact
that the client has told the lawyer inconsistent versions of the truth, and despite
the fact that the client's testimony is far-fetched or preposterous, unsupported by
other evidence, and dramatically contradicted by credible evidence.
Thus, the bar and the courts have effectively maintained the practical result of
the traditional view of the perjury trilemma. By disingenuously manipulating the
meaning of "knowing," they have enabled lawyers to preserve client confidences
7. 1908 CANONS 22 ("Candor and Fairness"); 1908 CANONS 15 ("How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a
Client's Cause"); 1908 CANONS 37 ("Confidences of a Client").
8. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953); ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945).
9. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBmlTY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
10. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Supplement 18 (Am. Bar Ass'n

1971).
11. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'i Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
12. Id.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL RULES R. 3.3

cmt.[10]-[ L].
14. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)(3); MODEL RULES R. 3.3 cmt. [10]-[111.
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and to continue to present clients' false testimony to courts in the ordinary
manner.
Part III notes, however, that there are nevertheless some cases in which
lawyers are taking seriously the apparent requirement to disclose client perjury. A
survey conducted by computer and interviews, plus an extensive informal review
over a period of four decades, indicate that almost all of those cases involve
clients who are forced by poverty to rely upon court-appointed lawyers.
Moreover, most of those clients appear also to be members of minority groups.
Thus, there is evidence of a de facto denial of equal protection based in
significant part on economic class and ethnicity.
Because of those cases, Part IV undertakes to show that when lawyers reveal
client confidences because they feel compelled by Rule 3.3 to do so, their conduct
violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. This is an issue that
no court has yet ruled upon. However, analogous authorities strongly support the
conclusion that a lawyer violates the Constitution by deliberately eliciting
unwarned admissions from a client and then revealing those admissions to a
court.
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment forbids an agent of the
state to reveal at trial admissions that have been elicited from a defendant who
has not first been advised by his lawyer about his privilege against selfincrimination. Nevertheless, ethical rules require the lawyer to deliberately elicit
incriminating information from the client without warning the client of the
consequences in advance. In addition, the rules require the lawyer to reveal the
client's incriminating confidences at trial if the client should testify falsely.
Moreover, the lawyer acts as an officer of the court who is subject to state
sanctions, including loss of a state-issued license to practice law, for failing to
comply with the state's ethical requirements.
Ironically, therefore, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right
to have counsel advise him about his Fifth Amendment privilege before the client
incriminates himself to a third-party agent of the state. However, there is no one
to advise the defendant about his Fifth Amendment privilege before he is induced
by his lawyer to incriminate himself. Accordingly, when a lawyer reveals at trial
the incriminating client information that the lawyer has deliberately elicited from
the client, the lawyer violates the client's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
I. THE BEGINNING OF THE CLIENT PERJURY CONTROVERSY
The question of how to deal with client perjury arose in the 1960's in informal
discussions among a small group of young criminal defense lawyers in
Washington, D.C. These lawyers got together from time to time to discuss tactical
problems like how to pick a jury or whether to defer an opening statement until
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after the prosecution's case-in-chief.15 One day, a member of the group said, with
considerable embarrassment, "My client is going to testify tomorrow, and he's
going to lie, and I don't know what I'm supposed to do about it." To our surprise,
we found that we all shared what we each considered to be a personal guilty
secret. That is, each of us believed that he or she was unique in facing that and
other serious ethical problems, and each assumed that he or she must have been
doing something wrong or it would not have been happening. Certainly, such
issues had never been recognized, much less
discussed, either in our law school
16
classes or in any professional conferences.
As we explored the issue of client perjury, we found that the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics were internally contradictory. 7 A
lawyer was required to "endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause
before advising him."' 8 As explained in an early ABA opinion: "[C]ounsel cannot
properly perform their duties without knowing the truth." 19 In order to encourage
clients to be candid with their lawyers, therefore, the Canons required lawyers to
preserve their clients' confidences. 20 Nevertheless, the Canons also required
lawyers to be candid with the court. 2 ' Thus, the trilemma: to know everything
possible, and to keep it in confidence, but to divulge it to the court if candor to the
court required it.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,2 2 holding that a
criminal defendant facing imprisonment is constitutionally entitled to legal
representation at trial, there was considerable concern about how enough lawyers
would be found to handle the high number of cases. Accordingly, I obtained a
grant to establish a Criminal Trial Institute, in which practicing lawyers who were
not involved in criminal defense would be trained in how to represent a criminal
defendant.23
In an introductory one-hour lecture, I discussed the ethical issues that my
friends and I had found to be particularly troubling. With regard to client perjury,
15. The group included, from time to time, Barbara Babcock, Gary Bellow, Sam Dash, A. Kenneth Pye,
Florence Roisman, Ralph Temple, and Jonathan Weiss.
16. Other issues included whether it is proper to give a client legal advice when the client might use the
advice to concoct a perjurious alibi or to commit other wrongs, and whether it is proper to cross-examine a
prosecution witness who the lawyer knows is testifying accurately and truthfully in order to make the witness
appear to be mistaken or lying. These issues are discussed in FREEDMAN & SMrrH, supra note 4, at Ch. 7
("Counseling Clients and Preparing Witnesses") and Ch. 8 ("Cross-Examining to Discredit the Truthful
Witness").

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

The Canonshad been promulgated by the ABA in 1908, and governed the conduct of lawyers at the time.
1908 CANONS 8.
ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930).
1908 CANONs 37. See 1908 CANONS 6.
1908 CANONs 22.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

23. The funding organizations were the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the United

Planning Organization. The Institute used techniques that have subsequently been used in the National Institute
for Trial Advocacy and similar programs.
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I noted that there are three ways to resolve the lawyer's problem. One possible
resolution that I discussed is to caution the client against giving the lawyer
incriminating information that might create ethical problems-what has since
been called the "lawyer-client Miranda warning." This is the model of
"intentional ignorance," which has been expressly condemned by the ABA; that
is, "[d]efense counsel should not ... intimate to the client in any way that the
client should not be candid in revealing facts . ... ,,24 Another solution I discussed
is to promise the client confidentiality, but to break that promise if the client later
proposes to give false testimony in his defense. The third solution, which I have
favored, is to make good faith efforts to dissuade the client from committing the
perjury, but, if the lawyer is unsuccessful in those efforts, to present the client's
false testimony to the court in the ordinary way.
The lecture was reported the next day in the Washington Post and, the day after
that, the United States District Court Committee on Professional Admissions and
Grievances sent me the letter saying that I was subject to disbarment proceedings
because of the opinions that I had expressed in the lecture. After four months,
which included a hearing and considerable public controversy, the charges were
dropped.
One of the best things to come out of the episode was a letter to the Washington
Postfrom Professor Anthony Amsterdam, which said in part:
Professor Freedman's views ... were probably right legal judgments but,
supposing for a moment that they were wrong, their wrongness hardly makes
Professor Freedman censurable. If disbarment were the fate of every lawyer or
judge in the District of Columbia who made a wrong legal judgment-or even
several grossly wrong legal judgments-we would have very few lawyers left,
and no judges at all.25
Professor Amsterdam also commented to Time Magazine that the "vaporous
platitudes called canons of ethics have somewhat less usefulness as guides to
lawyers in the predicaments of the real2 world
than do valentine cards as guides to
6
heart surgeons in the operating room.",
Ironically, the controversy over the lecture and the article stimulated my
interest and involvement in lawyers' ethics, a subject which, at that time, was not

24. STANDARDS FOR CRMUnrAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.2(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993). See
also STANDARDS FOR CRMtNAL Jus'rCE, The Defense Function, Standard 3.2, cmt. (Am Bar Ass'n 1971)

(warning that advising the client at the outset not to admit anything that might handicap the lawyer's freedom in
calling witnesses or in otherwise making a defense is "most egregious" and is advocated only by
"unscrupulous" lawyers); STANDARDS FOR CRaNmAL JusTicE, The Defense Function, Standard 3.2, cmt. (Am
Bar Ass'n 1993) (describing such conduct as a "flagrant" impropriety).
25. Anthony Amsterdam, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, May 1, 1966.
26. The Law: ProfessionalEthics, ThME, May 13, 1966, at 81.
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even recognized as an acceptable "field of law" by the American Bar Association. 27
II. THE ABA's SOLUTIONS TO THE PERJURY TILEMMA
A. THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908-1969) - PROTECTING
CLIENTS' CONFIDENCES GIVEN PRIMACY OVER CANDOR TO THE COURT

At the time of the 1966 lecture and article, there was significant support for the
resolution that I favored. For example, in its Formal Opinion 268 (1945), the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recognized
the conflict within the Canons of Professional Ethics regarding client perjury.
Resolving the conflict in favor of confidentiality, the committee stated: "While
ordinarily it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to disclose to the
court any fraud that he believes is being practiced on the court [Canon 22], this
duty does not transcend that to preserve the client's confidences [Canon 37]."
Eight years later, Formal Opinion 287 (1953) dealt with two situations. In one
a lawyer who had obtained a divorce for a client learned from the client that the
client had committed perjury in the divorce proceedings. In the other, a judge was
about to impose sentence upon the client based upon misinformation that the
client had no previous criminal record, while the lawyer knew from the client that
he did have a criminal record. The Committee determined that in both those
cases, the lawyer's obligation was to urge the client to disclose the truth, but to
remain silent if the client did not do so.
Again, the Committee recognized a conflict between the duty to preserve the
client's confidences,2 8 and the duty to reveal perjury.2 9 In addition, the
Committee acknowledged that the attorney is an "officer of the court." The
Committee explained the question-begging nature of that phrase, however, in the
following way:
We yield to none in our insistence on the lawyer's loyalty to the court of which
he is an officer. Such loyalty does not, however, consist merely in respect for
the judicial office and candor and frankness to the judge. It involves also the
steadfast maintenance of the principles which the courts themselves have
evolved for the effective administration of justice, one of the most firmly
established of which is the preservation undisclosed of the confidences
30
communicated by his clients to the lawyer in his professional capacity.
27. Eleven years later, in 1977, 1 succeeded in persuading a reluctant ABA Standing Committee on Law Lists
that legal ethics and professional responsibility should be recognized as an acceptable "field of law." Thus,
lawyers' ethics joined 155 previously recognized fields of law, including cemetery law and drainage and levee
law. See Monroe Freedman, Crusading for Legal Ethics, LEGAL TIMEs, July 10, 1995, at 25.
28. 1908 CANONS 37.
29. 1908 CANONs 22.
30. The Committee distinguished communications received from the client, and those received from other
sources, holding that only the former would override a duty to reveal the truth. William B. Jones, later Chief
Judge in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, dissented on that point, maintaining that
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That is, precisely because the lawyer is an officer of the court, he is bound by the
court's own principles of justice to maintain his client's confidences, even in the
face of the client's perjury.
B. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969-1983) DISCLOSING CLIENT PERJURY CONTINUES TO BE "UNTHINKABLE"
The Model Code, as originally promulgated in 1969, appeared to revive the
ambiguities regarding confidentiality that had existed under the Canons prior to
Formal Opinions 268 and 287. The Model Code recognizes that full knowledge
of the facts by the lawyer is "essential to proper representation," and that such
knowledge is facilitated by the "observance of the ethical obligation of the lawyer
to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client., 3 Nevertheless, the
original version of DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Model Code also appeared to require
the lawyer to reveal a fraud by the client upon a tribunal or a third party, just as
some provisions of the Canons had appeared to do 32 prior to Opinions 268 and
287.
DR 7-102(B)(1) had two operative clauses in the event of client fraud. The first
required that the lawyer "promptly call upon the client to rectify the [fraud]." 3 3
The second clause-the "and if' clause-provided: "and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, [the lawyer] shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal. 3 4 That appeared to reverse the policy under the 1908 Canons, and to
make candor to the court superior to client confidentiality in both criminal and
civil cases.
However, the ABA acted promptly to exclude criminal defense lawyers from
the disclosure obligation of DR 7-102(B)(1). In 1971, the House of Delegates
approved the ABA StandardsRelating to the Defense Function,in which the ABA
explained that the lawyer's obligation to reveal client fraud under the "and if'
clause of DR 7-102(B)(1) did not relate to false testimony in a criminal case.35
Then, in 1974, the ABA added a new clause, following the "and if' clause of
DR 7-102(B)(1). As a result of that amendment, the attorney was required to
reveal the client's fraud on a court or a third party, "except when the information
[was] protected as a privileged communication."

when the lawyer receives the information "as a result of his professional work for the client.. .such information
is a confidence or secret of the client that the lawyer is bound to preserve." ABA Formal Op. 287 (1953).
31. MODEL CODE EC 4-1.
32. 1908 CANONS 22 ("Candor and fairness"); 1908 CANONS 15 ("How far a lawyer may go in supporting a
client's cause").
33. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B)(1).
34. At the same time, Model Code EC 8-5 said that the lawyer should reveal any knowledge of "[firaudulent,
deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a proceeding before a tribunal.. .[unlessconstrained
by his obligationto preserve the confidences and secrets of his client." MODEL CODE EC 8-5 (emphasis added).
35. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Supplement 18 (Am. Bar Ass'n
1971).
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On a plain-meaning reading, the phrase "privileged communication" appeared
to mean only "confidences," a term of art that referred only to information that is
protected by the lawyer-client evidentiary privilege.3 6 If construed broadly,
however, the phrase "privileged communication" could have included "secrets."
The definition of "secrets" included all information gained in the representation,
and went so far as to protect information that would be embarrassing to the
client.3 7 Read that way, the "except" clause (forbidding disclosure) would have
swallowed up the "and if' clause (which appeared to require disclosure). That is,
the ABA's amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) could have been understood to nullify
the clause that says, "and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, [the lawyer]
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal." Interpreted in such a
way, DR 7-102(B)(1) would have completely restored the primacy of confidentiality over candor to the court.
That is what happened. In Formal Opinion 341 (1975), the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics considered whether the phrase "privileged communication"
in the new "except" clause referred only to clients' "confidences" or, more
broadly, to clients' "secrets" as well. The committee determined that the "except"
clause includes secrets, which means that a lawyer is forbidden to reveal a client's
fraud on a tribunal or third party if doing so would be "embarrassing" to the
client.3 8 As Professor Geoffrey Hazard has wryly remarked, "fraud is always
embarrassing," and the ABA's amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) therefore "eviscer39
ated the duty to report fraud.",
Opinion 341 condemned the apparent requirement of unamended DR
7-102(B)(1), that a lawyer disclose client fraud on the court or third parties, as
"unthinkable" and dismissed it as the result of an oversight in drafting. Instead,
Opinion 341 construed DR 7-102(B)(1) to "reinstate the essence of Opinion
287," and held that client confidentiality is "so important that it should take
precedence in all but the most serious cases." Acknowledging that "the
conflicting duties to reveal fraud and to preserve confidences [had] existed
side-by-side for some time," Opinion 341 added that "it is clear that there has
long been an accommodation in favor of preserving confidences either through
practice or interpretation." On the basis of "tradition ...backed by substantial

policy considerations," therefore, Opinion 341 reaffirmed the traditional model in
which client confidentiality takes precedence over candor to the court.

36. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(a) distinguished between "confidences" and "secrets." "Confidences" referred
narrowly to information protected by the attomey-client privilege, that is, information that cannot be used as
evidence in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the privilege vary somewhat from state to state, but basically
they require that the information be in a communication between a client and lawyer that is made in confidence
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance.
37. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(a).
38. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(a).
39. GEOFFREY C. HAzARD,JR., EIcs IN THE PRACnCE OF LAW 27 (1978).
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C. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) - THE
APPARENT CHANGE IN POLICY IN RULE 3.3 HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY
NULLIFIED BY INTERPRETATION OF "KNOWING"
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct appear to reject those
substantial policy considerations and to reverse the long-standing tradition of
upholding client confidentiality in cases of client perjury. If so, it would indeed be
"a major policy change" from earlier ethical obligations regarding client
perjury. 40 The change, however, is more apparent than real.
Under Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), a lawyer is forbidden to offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false. Also, under the same provision, if the lawyer offers
material evidence that the lawyer later learns to be false, the lawyer is required to
"take reasonable remedial measures." As explained in the comment to Rule 3.3,
"remedial measures" include the obligation to inform the court of the client's
1
4

perjury.

The reason the rule change is more apparent than real is that the lawyer has no
obligation either to prevent client perjury or to report it to the court unless the
lawyer "knows" that the client's testimony will be or has been perjurious.4 2
Moreover, the words "know" and "knowledge" have been defined in the
Terminology section of the Model Rules in the most restrictive terms. Thus,
"knowing" means "actual knowledge," and the ABA, the American Law
Institute, and the courts have all made it clear that a lawyer will rarely "know"
about client perjury.4 3

For example, in the words of ABA Formal Opinion 87-353, it will be "the
unusual case" where the lawyer "does know" that a client intends to commit
perjury. That opinion states that knowing can be established only by the client's
"clearly stated intention" to perjure himself at trial.
44
The Restatement takes its definition of "knowing" from the Model Rules.
Using the phrases "actual knowledge" and "firm factual basis," the Restatement
limits "firm factual basis" to facts actually "known to the lawyer" through
personal observation and statements by the client that the testimony or other

40. ABAFormal Op. 87-353 (1987).
41. See MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3, Comment on Remedial Measures:
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocates's proper course ordinarily is to
remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that
will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate
should make disclosure to the court ....
42. MODEL RuLES R. 3.3(a).

43. The way in which standards of "knowing" have been manipulated in rules of lawyers' ethics was first
recognized and analyzed in MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' Ermcs INAN ADvERsARY SYsTEM (1975) ("What
Does a Lawyer Really 'Know': The Epistemology of Legal Ethics").
44. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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evidence is false.45 Both the Model Rules and the Restatement say also that
"knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. ' 46 However, that inference can
be drawn only if the lawyer ignores what is "plainly apparent" and engages in
"conscious ignorance. 4 7 Moreover, despite the reference to "conscious ignorance," the lawyer may avoid "knowing" information that could be discovered
through reasonable inquiry.4 8
In Nix v. Whiteside the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel was not violated when a lawyer successfully
dissuaded his client from committing perjury. 49 Whiteside had told his lawyer
shortly before trial that he had seen "something metallic" in the victim's hand
before Whiteside had stabbed the victim to death. When the lawyer pointed out
that this was not consistent with previous accounts, and expressed disbelief,
Whiteside said, "[I1n Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a
gun, I'm dead."5 ° In response, the lawyer told Whiteside that testimony about
"something metallic" would be perjury, and that if Whiteside gave that testimony,
the lawyer would report the perjury to the court. As a result, the client omitted
that reference from his testimony.
The decision in Nix v. Whiteside is frequently misunderstood to have settled all
constitutional questions regarding a lawyer's obligations relating to client
perjury. In fact, Nix was limited to a single important constitutional issue.
Whiteside's unappealing contention was that in dissuading the perjury, his lawyer
violated Whiteside's right to effective assistance of counsel and prejudiced his
case. The Court, therefore, held only that when defense counsel dissuaded
Whiteside from giving perjurious testimony by saying he would reveal the
perjury to the court, the lawyer's conduct "fell within the wide range of
professional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable under the Sixth
Amendment. ' 51 However, as the Court noted: "Robinson divulged no client
communications until he was compelled to do so in response to Whiteside's
post-trial challenge to the quality of his performance. We see this as a case in
which the attorney successfully dissuaded the client from committing the crime
' 52
of perjury. ,
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes also emphasize that Robinson
"merely threatened" to reveal Whiteside's perjury, but "did not blow the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.; See also id. § 94 cmt. g.
MODEL RuLES R. 1.0(f).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at Reporter's Note cmt. c.
Id.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 166.
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whistle. 5 3 This critical factual limitation of the Nix decision leaves the client
perjury issue "still murkier" even than Chief Justice Burger's misstatements of
law and fact in the majority opinion. 4
Within weeks of the Nix decision, the ABA, in conjunction with the American
Law Institute, produced a videotape of several criminal defense lawyers and a
judge commenting on the case. The ABA/ALI commentators made it clear that
the trial lawyer's conduct approved by the majority in Nix represented a radical
departure from traditional, standard practice.5 5
One commentator described the defense lawyer in Nix as having gone
"bonkers" in his "brutal" overreaction to his client's statements. Another
characterized the notion that a criminal defense lawyer might be required to
divulge a client's perjury as "startling," "unworkable," and out-of-touch with the
dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship. A third commentator on the ABA/ALI
videotape said that a lawyer has an obligation to reveal client perjury only if the
lawyer has "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the client will commit a
"serious" fraud on the court. He added that the false statement in Nix about
having seen "something metallic" fell short of serious fraud.
In addition, soon after Nix, the Deputy Attorney General who won the case was
quoted in the ABA Journal as saying that if the lawyer does not "know for sure"
that a witness's evidence is false, the lawyer should present the evidence to the
court. 56 As long as the client "never admits that [the story] is false," he added,
most lawyers "suspend judgment and do the best they can." Any different
standard of "knowing,"
he explained, would be "at war with the duty to represent
57
zealously.",
client
the
The Eighth Circuit has similarly insisted upon a direct client admission of
perjury to establish "knowing" or "actual knowledge., 58 The court held that an
attorney must use "extreme caution" in deciding that a client intends to commit
perjury, and that nothing but "a clear expression of intent" will justify the
attorney's disclosure to the judge.5 9 The Second Circuit has also adopted a

53. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 29.19 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp.

2007) (emphasis in the original).
54. Id. The Chief Justice's conclusions, analysis, and use of authorities have been severely criticized.
Professor Lefstein has observed that the majority opinion "contains a shocking misstatement of the law
pertaining to client pejury." Norman Lefstein, Reflections on the ClientPerjury Dilemma andNix v. Whiteside,
CnM. JusT. 27, 28 (1986). Another critic of the Chief Justice's inaccuracies is Brent Appel, the Iowa Deputy
Attorney General who argued and won Nix v. Whiteside. See Brent Appel, Nix v. Whiteside: The Role ofApples,
Oranges, and the Great Houdini in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 23 CRiM. L. BuLL. 5 (1987); see also Monroe
H. Freedman, The Aftermath of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora'sBox, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 25
(1987).
55. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETmcs 190-91 (3d ed. 2004).
56. David 0. Stewart, Drawing the Line at Lying, A.B.A. J. 84, 88 (1986).
57. Id
58. United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1988).
59. Id.
at 445, 447.
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"clearly established" or "actual knowledge" standard. 6 0 In doing so, the court
approved of a definition providing that "[i]nformation is clearly established when
the client acknowledges to the attorney that he has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal., 61 The court observed that under any standard less than actual
knowledge, courts would be "inundated" with lawyers' reports of perjury.62
At another point in its opinion, the Second Circuit went further, indicating that
an admission alone will not be sufficient to justify disclosure by a lawyer. After
explaining that knowledge by the lawyer means "actual knowledge," the court
went on to say that the lawyer should disclose "only that information which [1]
the attorney reasonably knows to be a fact and which, [2] when combined with
other facts in his knowledge, would [3] clearly establish the existence of a fraud
on the tribunal. 6 3 Thus, even the client's admission might not suffice unless it is
corroborated by "other facts" that "clearly establish" the perjury.
The severe restriction of what a lawyer "knows" for purposes of Model Rule
3.3 was recently summarized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v.
McDowell.64 Absent "the most extraordinary circumstances," the court held, a
defense lawyer's knowledge must be based on "the client's expressed admission
of intent to testify untruthfully,"65and this intent must be made "unambiguously
and directly ...to the attorney.,
Nix itself forecast this development. Nix's majority opinion characterized the
case as one in which the defendant's "intent to commit perjury [was] communicated to counsel. 6 6 Moreover, four concurring justices cautioned that except in
"the rarest of cases" attorneys who "adopt 'the role of the judge or jury to
determine the facts'.. . pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and
loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment. ' 67 Also, Justice Stevens
observed that:
A lawyer's certainty that a change in his client's recollection is a harbinger of
intended perjury-as well as judicial review of such apparent certaintyshould be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest
witness may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously
overlooked.68
That is, even if the client tells the lawyer inconsistent stories, the lawyer does
not "know" that the client is lying.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Doe v. Fed. Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
Id. at 63.
Id.
State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 2004).
Id. at 514.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 163 (1986).
Id. at 189 (quoting United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that counsel must assist in presenting the
defendant's testimony despite the lawyer's strong belief that the client is going to
lie. This is so even though the lawyer's belief is based on the fact that the client's
story appears "[f]arfetched" and is "dramatically outweighed by other evidence. ' 69 The court expressly relied upon the concurrence in Nix that "[e]xcept in
the rarest of cases, attorneys who adopt the role of the judge or jury to determine
the facts pose a danger of depriving their 70clients of the zealous and loyal
advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment.,
Moreover, the two leading advocates of requiring lawyers to reveal client
perjury have rethought their policy justifications and have repudiated their earlier
72
7
conclusions. One is Marvin Frankel,. who wrote a series of articles and a book
proposing far-reaching changes in the ethic of confidentiality. Then, as a member
of the Kutak Commission, which drafted the Model Rules, Frankel was the
principal proponent of a broad disclosure rule. Revisiting those views several
years later, however, Frankel wrote, "The more I see of life and the practice of
law, the more justifiable I find the stance that we really ought not to be called
upon to 'know' when someone's story is false. 73
The other former advocate of requiring lawyers to reveal client perjury is
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Reporter who wrote and defended Model
Rule 3.3.74 Reconsidering the trilemma more recently, however, Hazard has
recognized that "[s]tatements cast in terms of 'complete loyalty' and 'complete
candor' must be recognized as hortatory, hypocrisy, or simply nonsense. 75
Further, based on his wide professional associations, Hazard has found that
"many judges show strong sympathy for an advocate whose client wants to
commit perjury in a criminal case." 76 For his own part, Hazard has concluded that
"requiring a criminal defense lawyer to 'blow the whistle' on client perjury is
77
futile or counterproductive.
A federal judge recently confirmed Hazard's observation, writing that "[a]ll
judges" face "many occasions" when they are "sure" a defendant or a witness in a
69. United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326, 327 (4th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. (citing Nix v. Wlhiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
71. Marvin Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpirical View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975); Marvin
Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 465 (1976); Marvin Frankel, From PrivateFights Toward Public
Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 516 (1976); cf., Monroe Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L.
ReV. 1060 (1975).
72. PARnSAN JusricE (1980). Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences and the Constitution,90
YALE L.J. 1486 (1981).

73. PartisanJustice:A BriefRevisit, 15 LMG. 43 (1989).
74. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669 (1981); Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?,35 U. MIAMI L.
RFv. 685 (1981).
75. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client FraudProblem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25
HOftSTRA L. Rev. 1041, 1049 (1997).
76. Id. at 1052.
77. Id. at 1060.
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criminal case has lied on the stand.78 Making no distinction between the
defendant and other witnesses, the judge added that there are times when a
witness' testimony is so "preposterous" that the judges "wonder how lawyers can
permit their clients or other witnesses to testify to the alleged facts, or to make
arguments based on the perjured testimony." 7 9 Nevertheless, she concluded, "[i]t
would be very difficult, and involve complicated and perhaps impermissible
intrusions into the attorney-client privilege
...
to attempt to make a factual
80
believed.",
lawyer
the
what
about
finding
On the basis of these authorities, a defense lawyer might well refrain from
concluding that her client's testimony is perjurious, despite the fact that the client
has told the lawyer inconsistent versions of the truth, and despite the fact that the
client's testimony is preposterous, unsupported by any other evidence, and
contradicted by credible evidence.
In that event, if the lawyer's decision should later be questioned, the same
standard of review would presumably be used in reviewing the lawyer's
judgment as the Supreme Court uses to determine whether there has been
ineffective assistance of counsel-that is, the court must "indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. '' 8 Thus, itisreasonably certain that a lawyer who
chooses to honor her client's confidences will not be found to have violated
Model Rule 3.3 by offering evidence that she "knows" to be false.
As a practical matter, therefore, the disingenuous use of the "knowing"
standard produces the same result under Model Rule 3.3 as the traditional model
that I favor. That is, the defense lawyer will present the client's testimony, true or
false, in the ordinary way. The difference is that under the traditional view, the
defense lawyer recognizes that frequently she does know the truth, uses that
knowledge to make good faith efforts to dissuade the client from committing
perjury, but, if she is unsuccessful, presents the client's testimony in the ordinary
way. Under Model Rule 3.3, however, the ordinary practice is for the lawyer to
indulge the notion that she does not "know" that the testimony is false, and to
present2 the client's perjury in the ordinary way. The end result, of course, is the
same.

8

78. Elaine E. Bucklo, When Lawyers Lie, 33 A.B.A. LrrG. 3, 4 (Winter, 2007) (Judge Bucklo sits in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern Jurisdiction of Illinois).
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, I GEO. J.
LEGAL EThncs 521, 536-37 (1988) ("[T]he defendant's right to testify cannot be denied by the unreviewed
conclusion of counsel .... Thus, the defendant is entitled, at the least, to an "on-the-record judicial hearing.").
81. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984)); see also text accompanying note 50. The conclusion seems justified that courts will apply the same

strong presumption in both situations because in each of them the courts are in the position of second-guessing a
decision made by a lawyer under the immediate and severe pressures of trial representation.
82. One difference between the two practices, of course, is that the lawyer who indulges the notion that she
does not "know" that the client's testimony is perjurious is not going to make good faith efforts to dissuade the
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A highly publicized illustration of Model Rule 3.3 in action is in the criminal
cases relating to the Enron scandal, in which both Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey
Skilling denied having committed any fraud or other wrongdoing. Although
twelve strangers on each of the juries in those cases were able to conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that both defendants were testifying falsely, their own
lawyers failed to reach that conclusion-and surely those lawyers will not be
subjected to professional discipline for those failures. On the contrary, the
defense lawyers were doing exactly what the ABA and the courts expect them to
do-to advocate zealously
on behalf of their clients without assuming the role of
83
the judge and jury.
In sum, in view of the traditional way in which the ABA has dealt with the
issue of client perjury84 as well as the practical effect of Model Rule 3.3, it is
wrong to characterize my position as "a fundamental change in the rules of
criminal law and ethics. ' 85 On the contrary, it is quite conventional in every
respect except for the disingenuous promulgation and interpretation of Model
Rule 3.3.
II. MODEL RULE 3.3 UNFAIRLY PREJUDICES DEFENDANTS WHO ARE POOR
AND MEMBERS OF MINoRrrY GROUPS
One might conclude that the issue of client perjury no longer warrants
discussion because, as a practical matter, virtually all authorities agree on the end
result-that is, that the lawyer should present the client's perjury in the ordinary
way.
Nevertheless, there remains a critical policy issue under Model Rule 3.3,
because there are still some cases in which lawyers conclude that their clients are
lying and then betray their clients' confidences. Unfortunately, those lawyers are
almost always court-appointed attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants, most of whom are members of minority groups. 86 This has produced a

race- and class-based double standard, creating a de facto denial of equal

client from committing the perjury. Indeed, if she were to do so, it could raise questions as to whether she did in
fact "know."
83. The fact that lawyers are not disciplined for failing to determine that their clients have committed perjury,
even when a jury has unanimously made that judgment beyond a reasonable doubt, indicates that the "actual
knowledge" standard of the Model Rules is even more stringent than "beyond a reasonable doubt." See also the
comment quoted, supra note 54, from the ABA/ALI videotape that a lawyer should reveal client perjury only if
the lawyer has "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the client will commit a serious fraud on the court.
84. See supraPart I.B.
85. Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman'sSolution to the CriminalDefense Lawyer's Trilemma is Wrong as a
Matter of Policy and ConstitutionalLaw, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 821, 828 (2006).
86. Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against Client Perjury Rules, 47
VAND.L. REv. 339 (1994).
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protection of the laws.

7

That conclusion is based on two sources. The first is a survey conducted by
Professor Jay Silver.8 ' The survey included a computer search of federal and state
cases over a fifteen-year period, ending in 1993.89 Second, Silver's findings are
confirmed by my own informal but extensive review of cases involving client
perjury, which spans over forty years. 9°
The way in which indigent criminal defendants are prejudiced when their
lawyers adopt the "remedial measures" of Model Rule 3.3 is illustrated in the
New York case of People v. DePallo.9' In DePallo the defense lawyer took four
steps regarding his client's testimony. First, early in the trial, the lawyer informed
the judge at a sidebar that "the defendant was going to take the witness stand, and
that he had previously told me he was involved in this homicide .... 92 Second,
after the defendant had testified, defense counsel told the judge in chamberswithout the defendant present-that his client "never told me what he was going
to say, but I knew it was not going to be the truth, at least to the extent of him
denying participation. ' 9 3
There is a legal fiction that judges are not improperly influenced by being told
incriminating information about the defendant by defense counsel. Occasionally,

87. Id. at 359. Oddly, Professor Gillers deliberately ignored this issue in contending that "Freedman's
Solution ...Is Wrong as a Matter of Policy." See 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 821 (2006). I had specifically asked
Gillers in advance of the Hofstra conference to address this issue. See id. at 841. When I raised it with Gillers
again during the question-and-answer session following his presentation at the conference, he responded: "So
now we got a little too complicated, because we are forced to look at the rules. All right. Well, then there
are-that would be part of the record and, you know, it depends upon the conversation." Id.; see also 17 THE
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 25 (2006) (letters from Freedman and Gillers confirming the previous exchanges
regarding the issue).
88. Silver, supra note 86, at 359.
89. Silver looked for cases in which criminal defense counsel suspected that the client would testify
untruthfully and in which counsel, as a result, disclosed the suspicion to the court, submitted a motion to
withdraw as counsel, or used the narrative method of direct examination. Id. The search was on LEXIS, using
the search term "client w/2 perj! & 'ineffective assistance' or falsehood or narrat! and date aft. 1977." Id. n.80. If
the race of the defendant or the status of trial counsel as privately retained or court-appointed or as public
defender was not revealed in the opinion, Silver followed up with further research, including telephone inquiries
of trial and appellate defense attorneys and prosecutors, clerks of court, and prison record-keepers, among
others. Id.
90. One inference I have drawn is that in the very few cases in which lawyers who have been paid fees use
the narrative method of direct examination or otherwise divulge client confidences to the court, there are
unusual circumstances. In one case, for example, defense counsel learned that his client was boasting to other
prisoners about how he was conning his "Christian attorney" into representing him even though he was guilty of
the crime. Washington v. Fleck, 744 P.2d 628, 629 (Wash. App. 1987). Consequently, the lawyer moved to
withdraw from the representation on the ground that the client had originally lied to the lawyer by denying his
guilt. Id.
91. People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 2001). The opinion in this case is particularly strange, because it
ignores New York's court-promulgated ethical code, which is based on the ABA Model Code of Professional
Ethics, and which forbids a lawyer to reveal client pejury. See N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L REsPoNsIILrrY DR
7-102(b)(1); FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 134-36, 174-77 (3d ed. 2004).
92. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d at 752.
93. Id. at 752-53.
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however, the prejudicial effect is revealed. For example, here is how one judge
justified an enhanced sentence on the basis of defense counsel's prejudicial
disclosures about her client:
How do I know that [you committed perjury]? It's hardly presumptuous on my
part when your own attorney had to come to me in camera and inform me that
she didn't want to stay on your case anymore as a matter of ethics
because you
94
perjured yourself and she knew you were perjuring yourself.

Most judges, of course, know enough to refrain from making Such admissions on
the record. 95
The third prejudicial thing that defense counsel did in DePallowas to require
the defendant to testify in narrative form. This method for dealing with the
trilemma first appeared in Section 7.7 of the 1971 version of the ABA Standards
Relating to the Defense Function. Under the narrative solution, rather than
examining the defendant in the normal question-and-answer way, the lawyer
identifies the witness as the defendant, tells him to tell his story to the jury, and
then turns his back on the defendant and sits down.
(Sometimes this is referred to,
96
oxymoronically, as "passive representation.")
Finally, the defense lawyer in DePallo complied with the ultimate requirement
of the narrative method by omitting in closing argument any reference to what the
lawyer had learned from the client to be false testimony.
This "remedial measure" of the narrative method is worse than revealing the
information to the judge alone, because the defense lawyer, by distancing herself
from the client's testimony, and then by ignoring that testimony in closing

94. People v. Darrett, 769 N.Y.S.2d 14, 24 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003).
95. But see Holmes v. United States, 370 F.2d 209, (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which an appellate judge expressly
relied upon incriminating information that had been put into the record by the defendant's own lawyer. In
Holmes, a majority voted to remand the case to determine whether the defendant had been denied certain due
process rights. However, the dissenting judge said:
Finding the Holmes' testimony at variance from the opening statement made by his trial attorney, the
latter in the absence of the jury addressed the court: "For purposes of the record, Your Honor, about
half of what the defendant said on the stand was a complete surprise to me." [Defense counsel] added
that in the course of "numerous interviews" the appellant had "consistently told me" a different
story ....From the foregoing, some idea can be gleaned as to why I do not join my colleagues in
thinking there even possibly could have been "prejudice."
370 F.2d at 212 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96. I originally argued that the narrative solution would never work, because prosecutors would object to the
presentation of the defendant's testimony in narrative form. MOrNROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETfncs INAN
ADvERsARY SYsTEM 37 (1975). The objection is virtually always sustained, because it deprives the adversary of
the opportunity to object when a question is asked, rather than moving to strike the testimony after the jury has
already heard it. Of course, I was wrong. Prosecutors rarely object to a defense lawyer telling a defendant to
testify in narrative, precisely because it helps to assure a conviction by prejudicing the defendant with the jury.
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argument, effectively tells the jury that her client is guilty. 97 Moreover, the
narrative method provides dramatic material for television and movie treatment,
making it public knowledge that a defendant who testifies in narrative is lying.9 8
The narrative solution has never been approved by the ABA, which deleted
section 7.7 from the Standards in 1979. Then, in 1983, a comment in the Model
Rules expressly rejected it, explaining that the narrative "compromises both
contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false
evidence but subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted
to counsel." 99 Even Chief Justice Burger, who had been the narrative solution's
principal supporter, noted its repudiation in Nix v. Whiteside.t°° Nevertheless, the
narrative solution still has its advocates, 1 and it has been adopted as part of Rule
3.3 in Massachusetts
and in the District of Columbia,10 2 and in some court
03
1
opinions.
A further problem with DePallois that the communications to the judge were
made without the defendant present, thereby denying him the opportunity to
contradict his lawyer's allegations. The court stated that the defendant had
properly been excluded from the session in chambers, on the patently specious
ground that defense counsel's incriminating statements to the judge had been
"simply procedural" and related only to "counsel's professional ethical obligations"l'-as if the substance of the lawyer's disclosure were not the defendant's
alleged admission of guilt. Moreover, the court presumed that the defendant
could have had no "meaningful input" regarding the accusations against him by
his lawyer., 0 5
In addition, there is no indication in DePallothat the defendant was ever put on

97. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 761 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003), where the defendant testified to
an alibi, but his lawyer contradicted the defendant's testimony by arguing an intoxication defense. The
defendant's inevitable conviction was upheld.
98. The popular television show The Practice (ABC television broadcast), has dramatized the narrative
method in an episode involving client petjury.
99. MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3, cmt. 9 (1983).
100. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170 n.6 (1986). Chief Justice Burger chaired the committee that
originally drafted section 7.7, and he wrote approving dicta about it in Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978). Significantly, he did not refer to these dicta in his opinion in
Nix.
101. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 80, at 525.
102. In the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals adopted the narrative solution despite both the Jordan
Committee-which drafted the District's version of the Model Rules-and the D.C. Bar's Board of Governors
favoring "a rule similar to that advocated by Professor Freedman." D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 234.
103. See, e.g., People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 729 (N.Y. 2001); State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500
(Wis. 2004); People v. Home, 2007 WL 1098684 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.) (relying on Standard 7.7 as having been
"formerly prescribed" by the ABA [at * 17], apparently without realizing that the 7.7 solution has never been
prescribed by the ABA. See supra text accompanying note 54).
104. DePallo,754 N.E.2d at 755.
105. Id. But see DePallo v. Burge, 296 F Supp. 2d 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (Weinstein, J.) (criticizing exclusion
of defendant from the conference between the lawyer and the judge in which the lawyer accused his client of
pejury).
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notice that his lawyer would omit his testimony in closing argument. If the
defendant had been told this critical information, he might have elected to
proceed pro se, rather than go forward
with a "champion" who intended to omit
106
argument.
closing
in
defense
his
Despite the defense lawyer's sabotage of his client's case in DePallo,the New
York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed DePallo's conviction, holding that
defense counsel's multiple betrayals of his client throughout the trial had been
"professionally responsible and acceptable."' 10 7 It is difficult to imagine this kind

of thing happening in a white-collar criminal case, or in any criminal case in
which the lawyer has been retained. However, that is the reality of how justice is
administered for indigent criminal defendants. As Professor Deborah Rhode has
said in a related context, "rich clients get richer while the poor get moral
oversight."' 10 8
IV. MODEL RULE 3.3 VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

An essential part of a defense lawyer's job in providing effective assistance of
counsel is to advise the accused about the privilege against self-incrimination and
whether it should be invoked in a particular situation.'°9 The obvious reason is
that "[a] layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and
boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege," and the assertion of that right
therefore "often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and
skilled in the subject matter."1' 0 Thus, as reiterated by the Supreme Court, the
Fifth Amendment protects an accused from being made "the deluded instrument
of his own conviction.""'
Accordingly, there is a crucial relationship between the Sixth Amendment right

106. See People v. Gomez, 761 N.YS.2d 156 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003),
107. People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d at 753, (quoting dictum in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170 (1986)).
Ironically, on the same page of the opinion in Nix, the Court noted the repudiation of the narrative solution.
108. Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspective on Professional Codes, 59 "IhX. L.
REv. 689, 713 (1981).
109. "Our Constitution... strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer
of his privilege against self-incrimination." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 488 (citing Note, An Historical
Argumentfor the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048-51 (1964)).
110. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1877 (1981) (Burger, C.J.) (quoting Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975)). As Justice Robert Jackson more pungently expressed it: "[A]ny lawyer
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Estelle, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (Burger, C.J.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581
(1961)) (quoting WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824)); see also Bran v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 547 (1897) (quoting WLLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1787)); Mitchell v. United
States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (the defendant should not be enlisted as "an instrument in his or her own
condemnation.").
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to counsel and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. " 2 It is
the lawyer's cautionary counseling of the client that gives meaningful effect to
the privilege." 3 Thus, the Sixth and Fifth Amendments work in tandem to forbid
a lawyer from eliciting incriminating information from a client who has not been
warned of the consequences and then revealing the elicited information to the
court.
The way in which the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination are inextricably interrelated was made clear in Massiah v. United
States.114 In Massiah, the defendant was indicted, retained a lawyer, and was
released on bail. While Massiah was free on bail, his friend and co-defendant,
Colson, agreed to cooperate with the government. Colson allowed an agent to
install a transmitter in his car, and then had a lengthy conversation with Massiah
in the car while the agent listened in. In the course of that conversation, Massiah
made several incriminating statements that were used against him at trial.
The Supreme Court held that Massiah's self-incriminating statements had to be
suppressed, because they had been "deliberately elicited by the police after the
defendant had been indicted, and therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled
to a lawyer's help.""' 5 The Court went on to hold that the Constitution must
protect the defendant's right to counsel in that extrajudicial setting, because
otherwise the defendant might be denied "effective representation
by counsel at
6
the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.""1
Accordingly, Massiah's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were jointly
violated "when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel."' " 7 Moreover, the
fact that the damaging testimony was not elicited from Massiah in a police
station, but when he was free on bail, meant that Massiah was "more seriously
imposed upon.., because he did not even know that he was under interrogation
by a government agent."' 8 In short, the Supreme Court has recognized that a

112. The defendant's Sixth and Fifth Amendment "right ... to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege

against self-incrimination" was neither argued to the Court nor discussed in Nix v. Whiteside.
113. "Cases in this court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional
rights." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
114. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
115. Id. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Spano had
involved a confession in a state court. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, requiring exclusion of the
confession as involuntary, was based on the totality of the circumstances under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although Massiah was a federal prosecution, the holding applies as well to state
prosecutions. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
116. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204 (quoting 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
117. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd,
377 U.S. 201). The present analysis does not rely on the Fourth Amendment "false friend" cases. However, the
language of those cases is consistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United
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pretended friend creates a more serious constitutional problem than a known
agent of one's adversary. As the Court has said, "An open foe may prove a curse /
But a pretended friend is worse." 9
Massiah was followed by United States v. Henry.1 20 There, a government
informer who had been placed in the cell with Henry established a relationship of
trust and confidence with him. As a result, Henry revealed incriminating
information to the informer. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the Court,
vacating Henry's conviction because it had been based in part on the admissions
elicited through a false relationship of trust and confidence.
The Court decided Henry under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but
Henry's relevance to the Fifth Amendment aspect of client perjury is plain. The
Chief Justice's statement of the issue, and the emphasis throughout the opinion,
was on the "admission at trial of incriminating statements made by [the
defendant] to his cellmate."1 21 As Justice Powell expressed it, the government,
through2 the cellmate, had engaged in "the functional equivalent of interroga12
tion."
In addition, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Henry, linked the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments together, noting that they reflect the Framers' intent to establish an
accusatory rather than an inquisitorial system of justice. '123 Rehnquist added that
"the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications
between the accused and his attorney," 12 4 and "[a]ny dealings that an accused
may have with his attorney are of course confidential, and 1anything
the accused
25
says to his attorney is beyond the reach of the prosecution."

States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). When a pretended friend, who was acting as a government informant, obtained
incriminatory statements from Hoffa in a conversation in Hoffa's hotel room, there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment because the risk that a friend will betray a confidence is "the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak." 385 U.S. at 303 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,465 (1963)). Hoffa
was reaffirmed in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which established that "a person confiding in
another takes the risk that the confidence may be misplaced and that the confidant may memorize or record the
statements and repeat them at trial." United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 846 (C.A. Ill. 1969).
When a client speaks to a lawyer, of course, he does not assume the risk inherent in ordinary conversation
with a friend; rather, the client has a reasonable expectation that the lawyer will protect his confidences, and
does not assume the risk either that the lawyer will reveal confidences without the client's consent or that there
are exceptions to confidentiality that have not been explained to him. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs R. 1.6, cmt. [2]
("A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed
consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation."); MODEL RULEs R. 1.4 ("A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.").
119. Spano, 360 U.S. at 323 (1959) (quoting John Gay, The Shepherd's Dog and the Wolf, in THE PoEncAL
WORKS OF JOHN GAY: VOLUME 337 (photo reprint 2001) (1787)).
120. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
121. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 295 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. 293 n.4.
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Moreover, both the majority and dissenting Justices recognized that a
statement can be "involuntary" for Sixth Amendment purposes if it has been
"deliberately elicited" by a covert government agent in the absence of counsel.' 26
The exclusionary rule of Massiah, the Court said, is expressly designed to
counter "'deliberat[e]' interference with an indicted suspect's right to counsel." 127 The Court also held that because Henry had not known that his cellmate
intended to relate his admissions to the government, "the concept of a knowing
and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply," and Henry
"cannot be held to have waived his right to the assistance of counsel."1 28 Again,
therefore, the Supreme Court gave particular constitutional significance to
admissions made to a pretended friend.
Henry also demonstrates that the future crime exception to the lawyer-client
evidentiary privilege is not relevant to the present analysis of client perjury. The
defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, safeguarded by
his constitutional right to counsel, is not dependent on his lawyer-client
evidentiary privilege, so exceptions to the evidentiary privilege are irrelevant. In
Henry, the defendant had no lawyer-client privilege (or any other evidentiary
privilege) with his cellmate. Nevertheless, the incriminating statements that the
defendant had made to the cellmate were excluded under the Sixth Amendment
because he was entitled to have his lawyer available to warn him when he was
making the self-incriminating statements to his cellmate. Thus, what is important
for constitutional purposes is not whether there is an evidentiary privilege
regarding the lawyer-client communications, but whether unwarned admissions
have been elicited from the defendant by an agent of the state who then uses those
admissions against him in court.' 2 9
Accordingly, even if the future crime exception to the lawyer-client privilege
would apply to false testimony regarding the past crime which is the subject of
the representation,' 30 that would not affect the present constitutional analysis of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The recognition in UnitedStates v. Henry of the interrelationship between the
Sixth and Fifth Amendments was again applied in Estelle v. Smith. '3' In that case,
a psychiatrist examined defendant Smith to determine his competence to stand
trial. Subsequently, based on what he had learned in the competency examinain the penalty phase of the trial that Smith was a
tion, the psychiatrist testified
32
future danger to society.'

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 269 (Burger, C.J. for the Court), 281, 2192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 282 n.6.
Id. at 273.
For further discussion, see FREMAN & SmrrH, supra note 4, at 176-177, 186-188.
But see id.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 459-60.
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The trial judge had ordered the State's attorney to arrange the psychiatric
examination regarding Smith's competence to stand trial, but apparently had
neither ordered Smith to cooperate with the psychiatrist nor advised him that he
did not have to do So. 1 33 Also, defense counsel were not notified in advance that
the examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness, and so did
134
not advise Smith about his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Again writing the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger reversed, holding
that the psychiatrist's testimony could not be used against the defendant in the
sentencing phase because "the psychiatric examination on which [the psychiatrist] testified at the penalty phase proceeded in violation of [Smith's] Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel." 135 The Court also held that a
waiver of the assistance of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but must also
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege ....

,136

Estelle v. Smith is particularly important to the present analysis because the
defense lawyer who elicits a client's incriminating information does not do so
initially for purposes of prosecution. Similarly, the purpose of the psychiatrist's
examination in Estelle was not initially prosecutorial.1 37 Rather, the trial judge,
sua sponte, had ordered the psychiatric evaluation of Smith for the neutral
purpose of determining his competency to stand trial. 138 Indeed, as the Court
recognized, the doctor's diagnosis might well have benefitted the defendant by
helping him to escape the death penalty. 139 Only at the sentencing hearing did the
psychiatrist's "role change[]," and only then did he become essentially "an agent
of the state recounting unwamed statements made in a post-arrest custodial
setting."' 140 Accordingly, the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had
been violated, and Smith's sentence was vacated.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the vitality of Massiah and Henry in
Fellers v. United States even as it noted a difference between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment standards for exclusion of self-incriminatory statements. 141 Under
the Fifth Amendment alone, exclusion depends upon whether there is in-custody
interrogation. 14 2 However, "an accused is denied 'the basic protections' of the
133. See id. at 456-457.
134. Id. n. 15. Indeed, it appears that defense counsel were not even informed in advance that any psychiatric
examination would take place. Id. n. 15.
135. Id.
136. Id. n.16.
137. Id. at 465. See also id. at 476 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Unlike the police officers in Miranda, Dr.
Grigson was not questioning respondent in order to ascertain his guilt or inhocence.").
138. Id. at 465.
139. Id. at 472.
140. Id. at 467. In a similar case, Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the Court applied the harmless
error doctrine to the Sixth Amendment right, but found that the psychiatrist's testimony had not been harmless.
141. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004).
142. Id. at 524.
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Sixth Amendment 'when there [is] used against him at his trial evidence of his
own incriminating words which federal agents.., deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." 143 The Court added
that it has "consistently applied this deliberate-elicitation standard in subsequent
Sixth Amendment cases" 44
"even when there is no interrogation and no Fifth
1 45
applicability."
Amendment
Moreover, as Massiah, Henry, and Estelle make clear, the "basic protection[]"
that is specifically at issue in these Sixth Amendment cases is the lawyer's advice
to the client regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, the privilege against self-incrimination takes on a broader constitutional
significance once the accused has a lawyer.
Surely a defendant's own lawyer cannot do what the pretended friend in
Massiah, the psychiatrist in Estelle, or the cellmate in Henry could not do-that
is, establish a relationship of trust and confidence and then "become an agent of
the State recounting unwarned statements." In fact, the role of the lawyer is a
more serious one in this regard than that of a cellmate. The Supreme Court has
never described trust and confidence between cellmates as "imperative," but it
has used that word in describing the relationship of trust and confidence between
lawyer and client. 146 Moreover, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Henry, "the
Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications
between the accused and his attorney."1 47 There is no such protection for
communications between the accused and his pretended friend, his cellmate, or
his court-appointed psychiatrist.
If, then, the lawyer's responsibility is to provide the basic protection of
warning her client about the risks of incriminating himself to other persons who
might later reveal his confidences, who has the responsibility of warning the
defendant about the risk of confiding incriminating information to his lawyer?
The difficulty is that the lawyer is forbidden to engage in "intentional
ignorance" by giving the client a "lawyer-client Miranda warning." That is, the
lawyer is forbidden to "intimate to the client in any way" that the client should
withhold information "so as to afford defense counsel free rein to take action
which would be precluded by counsel's knowing of such facts."' 48 This is an
elaboration on Model Rule 1.6, comment [1], which explains that a purpose of

143. Id. at 523(citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964)).
144. Id. at 524 (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 267, 270, (1980)).
145. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980)).
146. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
147. Henry, 447 U.S. at 295.
148. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.2(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993).
The purpose of the Standards is to elaborate on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by providing a
"consensus view of all segments of the criminal justice community about what good, professional practice is
and should be." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Introduction (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993). Thus, Standard 4-3.2 is
an elaboration on Model Rule 1.1 ("Competence") and Model Rule 1.6 ("Confidentiality of Information").

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL

ETHIcs

[Vol. 21:133

lawyer-client confidentiality is that the client is "thereby encouraged ... to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to ... legally damaging
subject matter." Beyond that, the lawyer must impress upon the client "the
'
imperative need [that the lawyer] know all aspects of the case."149
In addition, under Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), the lawyer is forbidden to "offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false," and is required to "take reasonable
remedial measures, including if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal" with respect
to evidence that the lawyer has offered and that she comes to know is false. Of
course, in those jurisdictions in which the lawyer employs the narrative method
as a remedial measure, the lawyer effectively discloses the client's confidences to
the jury (the finder of fact) as well as to the judge (the sentencer).
This means that the lawyer, in preparing for trial, is required to deliberately
elicit incriminating information from the client without first warning the client
that, if the client later testifies150falsely, the lawyer will reveal the client's
incriminating confidences at trial.
Therefore, just like the pretended friend in Massiah, the cellmate in Henry, and
the psychiatrist in Estelle, the lawyer elicits unwarned admissions from the
defendant and then becomes "an agent of the state recounting unwarned
admissions" at trial. Indeed, the lawyer is more clearly an "agent of the state"
than the other three, because only the lawyer is threatened with punishment by
the state for failing to report the defendant's damaging admissions. Ironically, the
Sixth Amendment "guarantees the accused... the right to rely on counsel as a
149. STANDARDS FOR CRnIMAL JusICE, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.2 cmt. (Am. Bar Ass'n 1993).
Model Rule 1.4(a)(5) is not material to this discussion because it says that the lawyer "shall consult with' the
client about the limitations" on confidentiality only after the lawyer "knows that the client expects assistance not
permitted by the Rules." MODEL RuLEs R. 1.4(a)(5). Even setting aside the "knowing" problem, the rule is clear
that this cannot happen until it is already too late for the lawyer to give fair warning to the client. That is, before
the lawyer informs the client of the risk that his confidences will be revealed, the client must have given the
lawyer knowledge of an intention to commit perjury.
When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted its version of Model Rule 3.3, the Court invited me
to address it in a formal hearing. Making the constitutional argument, I suggested that the Rule say expressly in
the comment that anything the lawyer learns before the warning should not be relied upon in making a decision
to reveal the client's perjury. The Court clearly understood the argument, but chose not to address the issue in
promulgating the rules. On the Court at the time was Charles Fried, author of The LawyerAs Friend: The Moral
Foundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
150. Even under the due process "totality of the circumstances" test, government agents are forbidden to use
this kind of trickery. State v. Nash, 421 N.W.2d 41, 43-44 (Neb. 1988) (defendant's reasonable understanding
that admissions would be confidential made them involuntary); State v. McDermott, 554A.2d 1302 (N.H. 1989)
(confession was not "voluntary," but "coerced," because it was given under the promise of confidentiality, and
"to allow the government to revoke its promise after obtaining incriminating information obtained in reliance on
that promise would be to sanction governmental deception in a manner violating due process."); People v.
Easley, 592 N.E.2d 1036, 1051 (I1 1992) (violation of due process where fellow inmate obtained admissions by
saying information was for defendant's lawyer); United States v. Goldstein, 611 F. Supp. 626, 632 (N.D. I11.
1985) (implied assurance that defendant's statements would not be used against him in a criminal prosecution
made admissions involuntary); United States v. Wolf, 601 F. Supp. 435, 441-43 (N.D. 11. 1984) (defendant's
statements were involuntary because they were made to Canadian agents in reliance upon promise not to give
them to IRS).
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'medium' between him and the State," 1 5 1 warning the defendant about potential
self-incrimination, but there is no one to serve as a medium between the accused
and his counsel. On the contrary, the defendant is denied "effective representation
by counsel [i.e., a warning to the defendant about the potential loss of his Fifth
Amendment
privilege] at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help
2
15

him."

It has been contended, however, that the lawyer for an accused is not a state
agent for purposes of cases like Massiah,Henry, and Estelle.153 The support cited
for that contention is Polk County v. Dodd,154 which involved a wholly different
issue-whether a public defender acts "under color of state law" for purposes of
42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
The Court held in Polk that a 1983 action would not lie because our system of
criminal justice "posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting
on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing 'the undivided
interests of his client.' ' ' 155 Accordingly, a public defender does not act "under
color of state law." Thereafter, in West v. Atkins1 56 the Court explained Polk by
saying: "[Tihe public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes
of § 1983 because he 'is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State's
157
adversary.,'

Polk is therefore irrelevant to the present issue. First, in Polk the Court was
interpreting a statute that allows civil actions to those who claim to be aggrieved
by state action. As a practical matter, if disappointed criminal defendants were
permitted to sue public defenders in civil actions, the courts would undoubtedly
be inundated by 1983 actions against unsuccessful defenders.
More important, when a defense lawyer in a criminal case is required by the
state to deliberately elicit unwarned statements and to report them to the court,
the lawyer is surely not "advancing 'the undivided interests of his client,"' as
posited in Polk.158 Rather, he is making the defendant "the deluded instrument of
his own conviction."1 59 Nor can it be said that the defense lawyer is acting as "the

151. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985))
(quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
152. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
153. Gillers, supra note 5, at 836.
154. Id. at n.77 (citing Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325 (1981)).
155. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318-19 (1981).
156. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
157. Id. at 50 (citing Polk County,, 454 U.S. at 322, n.13). Indeed, the Court has unanimously held that it is
"indispensable" that defense counsel act "independently of the Government and ... oppose it in adversary
litigation." Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
936 n.18 (1982).
158. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318-19.
159. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (Burger, C.J.) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 581 (1961)) (quoting WaiuLi HAwKiNs, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824)); see also Brain v. United
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State's adversary"" 6 when he is betraying his client's trust by "recounting
unwarned statements." On the contrary, he is "acting on behalf of the State or in
concert with it,"' 161 and he is doing so, moreover, in obedience
to the command of
162
the state and subject to state sanctions for any disobedience.
It has also been suggested that the defense lawyer can properly reveal the
client's perjury because statements elicited by agents of the state and revealed by
them to the prosecutor can be used by the prosecutor for impeachment. 1 6 3 This is
a non-sequitur. The fact that a prosecutor might be able to use such information
for impeachment purposes, t6' does not mean that defense counsel can be the
agent of the state who is required to do the revealing or the advocate who is
required to do the impeaching. As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[a]ny
dealings that an accused may have with his attorney are of course confidential,
and anything 65the accused says to his attorney is beyond the reach of the
1

prosecution."

None of this means that a defendant has a "right to lie" with impunity. One
immediate penalty is that the defendant's sentence may be enhanced if the judge
concludes that he has committed perjury in his defense. 166 Another penalty is that
the defendant who testifies falsely can thereafter be prosecuted for perjury.' 67
However, the penalties for perjury do not include a waiver of the defendant's
Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights to be warned by his lawyer of the potentially
harmful consequences before he unwittingly makes incriminating statements to
his lawyer. That can be done only by a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of
a known right, which is not possible when the defendant is unaware of the
consequences at the time he incriminates himself.
Nor is denial of the right to counsel in presenting his testimony a penalty for a
1 69
defendant's perjury. 168 In New Jersey v. Portash
defendant Portash had been
granted use immunity for earlier grand jury testimony. When he was subse-

States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897) (quoting WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1787)); Mitchell v.

United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (the defendant should not be enlisted as "an instrument in his or her
own condemnation.").
160. West, 487 U.S. at 50.
161. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318-19.
162. See also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989) ("Although the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure ... effected by a private party on his own initiative, the
Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the
Government .... Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government did
more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.") (emphasis added).
163. Gillers, supra note 5, at 836.
164. But see Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 354 (1990).
165. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.. at 264, 293, n.4 (1980) (emphasis added).
166. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
167. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
168. Nix v. Whiteside noted the repudiation of the narrative method. Nix v. Wihiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170 n.6
(1986).
169. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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quently prosecuted based on other evidence, the trial court ruled in limine that if
Portash testified to an alibi that contradicted his grand jury testimony, the
prosecution would be able to use the grand jury testimony to impeach him.
Accordingly, Portash did not testify at his trial. He was convicted.
On appeal, the Supreme Court assumed that Portash's immunized grand jury
testimony had been truthful and that his trial testimony would have been
perjurious.170 Nevertheless, the Court held that Portash had a constitutional right
to present his alibi without being impeached with his grand jury testimony.
Portash's conviction was therefore reversed by the Supreme Court in order to
allow him to present the alibi on retrial. Moreover, there was no suggestion that
Portash's lawyer had acted improperly in attempting to present the perjurious
alibi; on the contrary, the appeal could not even have been taken if the lawyer had
1
not assisted Portash in that effort. 71
Furthermore, the decision in Portash was based on the Fifth Amendment
alone. The case is that much stronger when the incriminating evidence has been
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment-that is, when it has been
deliberately elicited from the defendant by his own lawyer, acting as an agent of
the state, and forbidden to warn him in advance of the consequences. In that
event, the evidence cannot be used against the defendant at trial with respect to
17 2
either guilt or sentencing.
V. CONCLUSION
In formal opinions under its 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the ABA
recognized that a lawyer's duty to disclose fraud on the court is subordinate to the
obligation to preserve a client's confidences. The ABA explained that because the
lawyer is an officer of the court, she is required to maintain her client's
confidences even in cases of client perjury. Thereafter, in a formal opinion
interpreting its Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, the ABA expressly
relied on tradition as well as substantial policy considerations in stating that for a
170. See id at 452-53.
171. See also United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003). In response to appointed defense
counsel's motion for leave to withdraw on ethical grounds, the trial judge told the defendant that if he chose to
take the stand and present what his lawyer and the judge believed to be perjury, the lawyer's motion would be
granted. The Fourth Circuit reversed, explaining: "The defendant was told to waive either his right to counsel or
his right to testify, because neither his counsel nor the court was satisfied that his testimony would be truthful. In
so doing, the court leveled an ultimatum upon Midgett which, of necessity, deprived him of his constitutional
right to testify on his own behalf." Id. at 327 (quoting United States ex ret. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115,
120-121 (3d Cir. 1977) ("A defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to certain rights ....
He is entitled to
all of them; he cannot be forced to barter one for another. When the exercise of one right is made contingent
upon the forbearance of another, both rights are corrupted.") The Fourth Circuit added: "[T]he court
impermissibly forced the defendant to choose between two constitutionally protected rights: the right to testify
on his own behalf and the right to counsel." Id.
172. See supra, notes 109-152 and accompanying text (discussing Massiah, Henry, and Estelle v. Smith,
none of which have been considered in the context of the perjury trilemma by any court).
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lawyer to disclose her client's fraud on the court was "unthinkable."' 173
The traditional view that was recognized in those formal opinions appeared to
have been reversed in 1983, when the ABA adopted Model Rule 3.3 requiring
lawyers to take remedial action in cases of known perjury. In some jurisdictions,
remedial action has meant that a trial lawyer must distance herself from her client
by requiring the client to testify in narrative and then to omit any reference to the
client's false testimony in closing argument. The result of the narrative method is
that the lawyer effectively communicates to the jury as well as to the judge that
the lawyer believes that the client is guilty.
However, the appearance that Model Rule 3.3 brought about a major policy
change from the traditional view has been rendered practically meaningless by
the requirement that a lawyer have "actual knowledge" before taking any
remedial action. The result is that a defense lawyer may refrain from concluding
that her client's testimony is perjurious, despite the fact that the client has told the
lawyer inconsistent versions of the truth, and despite the fact that the client's
testimony is far-fetched or preposterous, unsupported by other evidence, and
dramatically contradicted by credible evidence. Through the disingenuous use of
the "knowing" requirement, therefore, the courts and the ABA have effectively
maintained the result of the traditional view.
Nevertheless, there remains a critical policy issue under Model Rule 3.3
because there are still some occasions when lawyers conclude that their clients
are lying and then betray their clients' confidences. Unfortunately, those lawyers
are almost always court-appointed attorneys representing criminal defendants
who are poor and members of minority groups. This has produced a race- and
class-based double standard, resulting in a de facto denial of equal protection of
the laws.
It is therefore important to consider the point that Model Rule 3.3 violates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. This is an issue that no court has
yet ruled upon. However, analogous authorities strongly support the conclusion
that a lawyer violates the Constitution. by deliberately eliciting unwarned
admissions from a client and then revealing those admissions to a court.
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment forbids an agent of the
state to reveal at trial admissions that have been elicited from a defendant who
has not first been advised by his lawyer about his privilege against selfincrimination. Nevertheless, ethical rules require the lawyer to deliberately elicit
incriminating information from the client without warning the client of the
consequences in advance. In addition, the ethical rules require the lawyer to
reveal the client's incriminating confidences at trial if the client should testify
falsely. Thus, the lawyer, as an officer of the court, acts under state compulsion,
subject to state sanctions including loss of a state-issued license to practice law, if

173. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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the lawyer should fail to comply with the state's ethical requirements.
Ironically, therefore, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right
to have counsel advise him about his Fifth Amendment privilege before the client
incriminates himself to a third-party agent of the state. However, there is no one
to advise the defendant about his Fifth Amendment privilege before he is induced
by his lawyer to incriminate himself. Accordingly, the client is unable to make an
informed and voluntary waiver of a known right before giving the lawyer
incriminating information. Therefore, when a lawyer later reveals at trial the
incriminating information that the lawyer has deliberately elicited from the client,
the lawyer violates the client's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Linking the Fifth and Sixth Amendments together, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that they reflect the Framers' intent to establish an accusatory rather than an
inquisitorial system of justice. He added that the Sixth Amendment protects the
confidentiality of communications between the accused and his attorney, and that
anything the accused says to his attorney is beyond the reach of the prosecution.
It is particularly ironic, therefore, that Model Rule 3.3 turns the criminal defense
lawyer into the functional equivalent of the prosecutor of her own client, charged
with disclosing her client's incriminating confidences at trial.

